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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOYLE LAWRENCE, an infant, by 
JESSE LAWRENCE, his Guardian 
ad Litem, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
BAMBERGER RAILROAD COM-
PANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Civil No. 8244 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATE~1ENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts in appellant's brief is believed 
to be incomplete and, except for its description of the 
accident scene, is vague and n1is.leading. It -contains no 
references to pages of the record. Therefore, we have 
dee·med it necessary to make our own statement of the 
record in order that the Court will have a proper under-
standing of the problern presented for determination. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
Henceforth, the parties will he designated as plain-
tiff a·nd defendant and references to the record will 
relate to the red numerals stampe~d on each page. of the 
record rather than to the typed numerals on the tran-
scrip~t of testimony, \Vhich latter numerals have been used 
in the ''Argument'' section of plaintiff's brief. 
This is an action to recover damages for personal 
injuries.. At the conclusion of piain tiff·; s . evidence the 
Distriet Court granted a .motion for dismissal and there-
after entered judgment for ·defendant. The plaintiff 
file-d a motion for new trial and, after· hearing oral 
argument, the court ~denied this motion. The plaintiff 
has appealed to this Court .from the judgment and from 
the order denying his motion for a new trial (R. 110). 
Plaintiff's ·complaint, as amended at the first of two 
pretrial hearings, alleged that on March 9, 1951 plain-
tiff ·suffered peTsonal injuries when he was struck by 
a triain owned and operated by defendant. It was alleged 
that the train was ''willfully, wantonly all!d negligently 
driven over the body'' of the plaintiff. (R. 1) ~ In its 
answer defendant admitte(j that its train struck the 
plaintiff, hut it denied that if was guilty of negligence 
and alleged that plaintiff's con·duct contributed to his 
injury, or that his injuries were solely caused by his 
own eonduct. 
Two pretrial hearings, and the trial its.elf, were 
conducted by Judge A. H. Ellett, sitting without a jury. 
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The accident occurred on the railroad right-of-way 
of the defendant eo1npany near the intersection of Eighth 
North and Third 'Vest Streets in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
At this point defendant maintains double railroad tracks 
running in a north-south direction. The tracks are 
crossed at a right angle by Eighth North Street, and 
immediately north of the edge of the street the:re is an 
as·phalt area on each side of the tracks vrhich areas are 
used by passengers in waiting for, and boarding, inteT-
urban electric passenger tr·ains (See photo, E;xhibit 1). 
The record does. not reveal plaintiff's age. He was 
a student at West High School (R. 48). He was described 
by a medical witness, Dr. N.elson, as being of medium 
s~ze and ''somewhat smaller perhaps'' than five feet 
eleven and one-half inches, but not smaller than defend-
ant's counsel, Mr. Snow (R .. 38), (who is five feet nine 
and one-'half inches tall). For several years plaintiff 
had been afflicted with museular dystrophy. As a result 
of this condition he walked vvith a rolling gait. However, 
Dr. Nelson testified that the degree of development of 
muscular dystrophy in the plaintiff vvas not such that it 
was likely to be observed by a layman, although the 
doctor felt that he would have no ~difficulty as a physician 
deter1nining that something was wrong with the plaintiff 
(R. 37, 38). 
Dr. Nelson was the only medical witness called by 
plaintiff. He first examined plaintiff in August, 1951, 
approxin1ately five months after the accident (R. 40). 
At that time plaintiff was also suffering from a mental 
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condition kno"\\rn as sehiz'Ophrenia. This condition mani-
fests itself by delusions and hallucinations. It was Dr. 
Nelson's opinion that plaintiff had been suffering from 
this condition for ap·proximately one year, but he could 
not express any opinion as to the ·degree of severity 
of the condition at the time of the accident (R. 40). The 
doctor expressed the opinion that plaintiff might have 
had only a mild condition p-rior to· the accident, and that 
the c?~ndition had been aggravated 1by tihe accident (R. 
31, 41). 
While it was clear theref·ore that Dr. Nelson could 
not describe with accuracy plaintiff's condition on the 
day of the accident, it is a fair inferen;ce from the 
record to say that plaintiff was then 'suffering from some 
de·gree ·of schizophrenia. 
Plaintiff appeared at the scene of the accident just 
prior to 4 o'clock in the afternoon. At that time, defend-
ant's train, consisting of a locomotive, s.even loaded 
freight cars, and one empty ear (Ex. 2), was proceeding 
south and approaching the area ·of Eighth North and 
Third· West Streets.. The locomotive was an ·electric 
type, op·erated by a motorman. The remainder of the 
crew consisted of a trolleym·an, a conductor and a brake-
man .. (R. 65). 
As is seen fron1 Exhibit 1, the tracks curved to the 
northwest several hundred feet north of the crossing. 
As ·the train rounded this curve and came into the 
straight tracks, the trolleyman, Skeen, testified that he 
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saw plaintiff "'alk frorn the a3phalt vvaiting area on the 
east side of the tracks. Plaintiff went aeross both sets 
of tracks to the. vYest waiting area. When he was firs.t 
seen by Skeen, the train was approximately 150 yards 
away. (R. 71). It was at about this point that the 
motorn1an shut off the train po\ver and first applied 
air to the air ·brakes ( R. 66). 
When the train \Yas about 100 yards from the point 
of impact, Skeen observeq plaintiff, (who had been 
standing in the west waiting area, facing west,) turn 
around, 'valk east again, and take a position in the middle 
of the southbound tracks, ·facing the oncoming tr,ain CR. 
71, 72). There was nothing unusual or peculiar about 
the way plaintiff walked at this time, according to Skeen 
(R. 76). It \Vas apparently not unusual for a person 
to \Valk on the track and stand there in the face of an 
oncoming train, since plaintiff's counsel elicited frorn 
Skeen the fact that such "incidents are bountiful" (R. 
75). 
As the train continued forward, plaintiff made no 
move to leave his position in the center of the track. 
(R. 82). During .the last 100 yards before impact, the 
train bell was ringing, the air horn was sounded in short 
-blasts, and the motorman leaned out the window of the 
locomotive cab and shouted and \Yaved his arms (R. 72, 
73). Although there is no evidence in the record on 
the speed of the train, it appears to be a fair inference 
that it was rnoving slowly, since it did not traverse much 
distanee while plain tiff 'vas moving back and forth across 
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the traclrs, and it came to a full stop, after the emergency 
application of brakes, in approxin1ately. 200 feet, even 
though the totHl -vveight of the train exceeded 788,300 
pounds. (R. 84, Exhibit 2). 
Even though the train hell and horn were being 
sounded and the motorman was shouting and waving his 
arms, plain tiff "ras motionless, except that he shifted 
from one foot to the other (R. 83). According to Skeen, 
who was the only ey·e-witness who testified, plaintiff 
''just stood watching us that kid was just seared 
stiff ... " (R. 83). 
When the train reached a point about 50 yards from 
plaintiff, Skeen decided plaintiff was not going to move 
off the tr-ack and, at that point, the motorman threw 
all available air into the braking system in an emergency 
stop procedure (R. 78). Despite these measures, the 
train continued on, striking the plaintiff and ·coming to 
a stop fifty or sixty feet beyond (R. 84). Plaintiff's leg 
was so severely mangled it was necessary to amputate 
below the knee.· (R. 24). 
According to what plaintiff 'Sl;lhsequently told his 
fiather and Dr. Nelson (R. 26, 89), he had been told by 
a voice to get on the track to test his faith in God. He 
sai~d he \Vas told no harm would come to him, but at the 
same time, he recognized there was danger present. In 
the ·opinion of Dr. Nelson, there would have been no 
true test of his faith in God if there had been no danger 
(R. 29). 
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The evidence concerning plaintiff's mental con-
dition on the day of the accident vvas nece,ssarily bas-ed 
upon his interviews vvith Dr. Nelson 5 months later, 
since no eYidence \Yas produced concerning any· medical 
consultations or treatn1ent at or about the time of the 
accident. Dr. Nelson conceded (R. 35) that what plaintiff 
told him in August, 1951 about the accident was not 
necessarily accurate, since a patient in such condition 
may have a faulty memory, or may, at the time of inter-
view, be even then suffering from another delusion, upon 
which his story would ·be based. (R. 36, 37). 
In ruling upon defendant's motion for dismissal at 
the conclusion of plaintiff's case, the trial court stated 
that he found no ·negligence upon the part of defendant's 
motorman, since there was nothing in the ap·pearance of 
plaintiff, vvhile he stood upon the track, to give notice to 
the motorman that plaintiff was incapacitated or other-
wise unable to move 'from the track. ( R. 95-96). 
Following plaintiff's appeal from the judgment 
and ruling of the trial court, defendant filed its own 
Statement of Points by way of cross~appeal, contending 
that the tria'l court erred in ruling plaintiff was not 
contributorily negligent because of his mental condition. 
(R. 109). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRAN'TED 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL SINCE PLAIN-
TIFF'S EVIDENCE FAILED TO PROVE THAT DEFEND-
ANT WAS NEGLIGENT. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED 
DEFENDANT'S MO·TION FOR DISMISSAL SINCE PLAIN-
TIFF'S EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
THAT PLAINTIFF'S CONDUCT WAS THE PRO'XIMATE 
CAUSE OF HIS INJURIES. · 
.III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED 
DEFENDANT'S MO·TION FOR DISMISSAL SINCE PLAIN-
TIFF'S EVIDENCE E S T A B L I SHED CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER o·F LAW~ 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT RE-
VERSIBLE ERROR IN EX·QLUDING THE TESTIMONY OF 
THE WITNESS SKEEN RELATIVE TO OVERLOADING OF 
THE TRAIN. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT C 0 R R E C T L Y GRANTED 
DEF·ENDANT'S MOTIO:N FOR DISMISSAL SINCE PLAIN-
TIFF'S EVIDENCE FAILED TO PROVE THAT DEFEND-
ANT WAS NEGLIGENT. 
It is fund:amental in the law of torts that reasonable 
foresight of h·arm is essential to the ·concept of negligence 
an~d supplies the criterion for determining whether negli-
gence existed in a particular cas.e. A person is not 
bound to foresee every possible injury which might occur,. 
or every p·ossible eventuality, but only those that are 
reasonably foreseeable. A person is. not bound to foresee 
and provide ·against casualties which are, in the light of 
human experience, ·beyond the range of probability, or 
which would not occur except under circumstances which 
are exceptional, and failure to anticipate or guard ·against 
a remote possibilit~r of accident does not constitute 
a-ctiona:bl e negligence. 
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The existence of negligenee in a given situation Inust 
be deter1nined on the facts as they appeare~d at the time. 
Foresight, not retrospect, is the standard of diligence. 
Negligence cannot be satisfactorily established merely by 
showing t'hat had the actor acted otherwise no accident 
\\'"ould have happened, or by the fact that after an accident 
has happened it ean then be shown howitcouldhave been 
prevented, or avoided, or by the fact that the person 
charged failed to exercise that degree of care which 
would have prevented the injury. 
The proper inquiry is not whether the accident might 
he avoided if the one charged with negligence had antici-
pated its. occurrence, but whether, taking the circum-
.stances as they then existed, he was negligent in failing 
to anticipate and provide against the occurrence. 
These are familiar and tested principles. They 
require no citation of. authority, but supporting cases 
'vill be found at 65 C.,J .S. 354-362 (Negligence, Section 
5 ). 
These basic concepts were 'veil understood by the 
trial court in ruling upon defendant'·s 1notion for dis-
missal at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, at which 
time the court said : 
''I find as a matter of law that the engineer 
in charge of the train was not negligent in that 
prior to the time when he was within approxi-
mately 50 yards he 'had no re·ason to believe that 
the plaintiff would not remove himself from 
· between the rails of the track upon which the 
engine was running, and that at that time it was 
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10 
too late for him to stop the train. Inasmuch as 
he ha·d seen the plaintiff ~ambulatory and walk in 
front of _the train, there was nothing to place 
him on guard or on notice that the plaintiff was 
insane or otherwi'Se incapacitated." (R. 95-96) 
Plaintiff, however, argues .that a r-ailroad enginee-r 
has a duty to stop his train immediately upon observing 
a person upon the track. He cites Choqu.ette v. Key 
System Transit Co., et al., (D~strict Court of Appeal of 
Calif., 1g.31) 5 P. ( 2d) 921, ·to sup·port this novel and 
startling. assertion. In that case plaintiff brought action 
for personal injuries sustained when she was struck by 
a train while erossing the tracks in the ·city ·of Berkeley. 
Plaintiff had alighted from a street car and was stru·ck 
by a train of the Atcheson, Topeka & Santa Fe R·ailway 
Co.· The engineer saw plaintiff start to cross the track. 
When he s~aw her step into a place of danger he blew the 
whistle and turned off the throttle. The locomotive was 
then about forty feet away. T·he testimony was in con-
flict as to when t1he brakes were applied, whether hefore 
or after plaintiff was struck. The Court said: 
"T:here is nothing in this evidence, in our 
opinion, which would even justify an inference 
that the engineer when he first saw plaintiff 
failed to exercise that degree of care which the 
law required of him. As soon as he perceived 
or realized that plaintiff might be inattentive 
to peril he soun·ded his whistle, and at this time 
there was nothing to e:reate a dou;ht as to whether 
he sincerely believed the calamity would be pre-
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vented by the activity of plaintiff. Under sueh 
circumstances, he did all tha.t was required of 
him.'' 
'!'he judgment of non-suit in favor of defendants 
was affir1ned. It is obvious that this decision is ~ot 
authority for the rule contended for by plaintiff.· 
Plaintiff also cites Green v. Los Angeles Terminal 
Rwy. Co., (Calif. 1903), 76 P. 719, as authority for 
i1nposing an absolute duty to stop a train when a pe~rson 
is on the track. 
That was an action for \\~rongful death of a person 
struck by a locomotive. The evidence showed that 
deceased wa:s guilty of contributory negligence, hut that 
the engineer could have .avoided the collision by slacken-
ing the speed of the train or warning deceased of her 
danger, and upon this theory of last ·clear chance the 
verdict in favor of plaintiff was affirmed. (Emphasis 
added). 
On re-hearing, the case wa:s revers·ed and remanded 
for a new trial ·because the court determined that the 
doctrine of last clear chance was not applicable. 
Olson v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., (Minn., 1901) 87 
N.W. 843, also cited by plaintiff as support for the rule 
asserted, held a pers.on failing to look in the direction 
of an approaching train to be guilty of contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law. The plaintiff in that case 
contended that defendant's servants could have dis-
covered plaintiff's danger and their failure to ring bell 
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or make an effort to avoid the accident authoriz·ed sub-
mission of the case to th-e jury. The court said: 
''The engineer could not be held to suppose 
absolutely, as a matter of law, that a young man 
of good inteiligence, with average faculties, before 
going. on a railway crossing would keep his head 
turned away from the direction which a train 
might he approaching. . . . " ( p. 844). 
The last case cited by plaintiff upon this proposition 
is L.ee v. Market St. Ry. Co., (Calif., 1901) 67 P. 765. 
This case simply ho~ds that under the peeuliar facts 
present, and in view of the. conflict in testimony, the 
.matter was properly submitted to the jury. The holding 
cannot be considered to support plaintiff's position in the 
present cas.e. 
It will he noted that each of these cases was based 
upon the ·doctrine of last clear chance. This doctrine was 
not framed as an issue at either pre-trial in the present 
cas.e an~d was not urged prior to . this appeal. Also, in 
each of the cited cases it was an inattentive plaintiff who 
was injured. Such cases can h·ave no application under 
the fa:cts of the instant case where the plaintiff was 
. ob~io~'i:v aware of the .approaching train and did not 
indicate iri any way that he would not remov.e hims·elf 
from the track until it was too late to avoid the accident. 
Plaintiff, apparently conscious of the fact .that the 
decisions cited do not supp·qrt the rule· urged, argues 
that ~an engineer must not pass that point where he can-
not control his train in time to avoi~d injury. In sup-
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13 
port of this argu1nent, plaintiff, at the top of page 15 
of his brief, quotes a rule from American Jurisprudence. 
In ordeT. for the quoted rule to give aid to plaintiff, 
counsel apparently believed it necessary to omit -a key 
phraHe from the first portion of the rule and to omit 
co1npletely the concluding sentence. The complete rule 
is set forth below, \vith the portion Oinitted ·by counsel 
italicized : 
''Due care generally does not require the 
engineer to stop the train, but he may act on the 
supposition that the traveler wHl stop before 
reaching the track. If, however, the traveler ·con-
tinues his course, the engine·er must not rest upon 
'this supposition so long :as to allow his engine to 
reaeh the point wheTe it will become impossible 
for him to control his train, or give warning in 
· time to prevent injury to th~ traveler. When it 
is apparent, or. when in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence commenswr.ate w·ith the surroundings it 
sho1ild be apparent, to the cornpany that a person 
on its track or abou.t to get on its track is unaware 
of his danger or c-annot get out of the way, it 
becomes the duty of the comp.any to use such 
precautions, by warnings, applying brakes, or 
otherwise,. as may be 'reasonabty necessary to 
avoid injury to him.'' 44 American Jurispru-
dence 749 (Railroads) Section 509. 
It is thus clear that counsel cannot use this rule to 
support plaintiff's argument. The record is conclusive 
that warning was given and plaintiff was, and appeared 
to he, a'vare of the approach of the tr.ain. 
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The case of Eleddles v. Chica,go N.W. Ry. Co. (Wis., 
1890) 46 N.W. 115, also quoted from, involved an inatten-
tive seven year old. plaintiff oblivious of the approach 
of the train. It vvas ~admitted that no 'vhistle was sounded. 
Such cases have no application under the facts of 
this case. 
The rule of la:vv vvhich is controlling under the facts 
of this ease is well -state·d in American Jurisprudence: 
"Th~ mere fact that the engineer sees ape~­
son on or dangerously near- a railway track in 
front of his moving train -does not require him to 
-endeavor to stop the train,.- for he has a right to 
assume, in the absence of anything to indicate 
otherwise,_ that such person will get out of his 
dangerous position in time to avoid a collision 
and inj-ury, and the doctrine of last clear chance 
is not ealled into operation. It is only when it 
-beeomes or s:hould become- apparent that such 
person· 'ijs apparently placing himself in a posi-
tion of danger without b-eing aware of the 
approaching' train or car that it is plainly the 
duty of trainmen_ to take -cognizance of that fact 
and avoid injury to him if practicable. 
· * * * From the .character an·d momentum of a 
railroad train, and the requirements of public 
travel by means thereof, it cannot be expected that 
it shall stop- and give precedence to -an approach-
ing traveler to make . the crossing first; the 
traveler must yield the use of the railroad track 
to an approaching train, an·d the conduct of the 
train. crew may he la\vfully predicated upon the 
expectation that travelers will observe their duty 
in this regard.'' 44 A·nterican Jurisprudence 727, 
734-5 (Railroad's) 
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This rule vvas, incidentally, quoted with ~approval in 
Ross v. Fleming (I{an., 1948), 194 P. (2d) 491, another 
decision cited by plaintiff. None of the other de-cisions 
cited by plaintiff are inconsistent with this rule. 
A 1nicroscopic exarnination of the entire record in 
this ease fails to sho'v any evidence that a reasona1ble 
man in the position of the engineer of defendant rail-
road would, prior to the occurrence, have foreseen the 
likelihood of injury to the plaintiff. That there was 
nothing ''startling or unusual'' (R. 38) about the appe,ar-
ance of plaintiff on the day of the accident is we~ll 
dernonstrated by the testin1ony of witness Blaine Skeen, 
Trolleyman, called ~by plainti.ff: 
"Q. In your observation of this boy, did you 
notice anything peculiar ·or unusu·al about 
him that was different from other people 
you have seen standing at a track~ 
A. How do you mean~ 
Q. Well, did you notice anyt'hing that led you 
to think he looked different~ Did he walk 
any differently from a normnl pe-rson~'' 
A. No, not that I could tell. 
Q. Did he do anything that led you to believe 
he wasn't going to get off the tracks~ 
A. Yes, about - seemed like about 50 yards 
fron1 the point of impact." (R. 76) 
On cross-exarnination this vvitness stated that vvhen 
the engine 1Nas about 50 yards fron1 the point of impact 
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it ap·peare·d that the plaintiff "\\7-as not going to get off 
the track and that at that time etnergency brake appli-
cation was made. Some brake ap·plication had been made 
prior to that time (R. 78). · 
Piaintiff was of mediun1 size, ordinary appear·ance, 
and had been observed walking in .a normal manner. 
Evidence ~as to his n1anner of walking on other occasions 
is not p·ertinent in view of the testimony of plaintiff's 
witness. 
Now here is the fallacy of plaintiff's position more 
clearly illustrated than on p·age 7 of his brief, where he 
asserts that ''the general rule of law covering the instant 
case'' permits the train engine·er to presume that ·a per-
son on or near the tracks is "in possession of his natural 
faculties'' and will take due care of his own safety until 
tthe engineer ''knows or should know that the person 
apparently will not get ... out of· danger, or until the 
situation otherwise ·dis·closes: itself to a reasonable man 
on guard.'' 
It is inherent, in such a rule, that plaintiff must 
show some evidence which would in·dicate to a ''reason-
able man on guard'' that plaintiff would not get out 
of ·danger. This rule defe·ats plaintiff's cas.e since he 
has failed to show any such evidence. Precisely the con-
trary is shown by the testimony of plaintiff's principal 
'vitness that there 'vas nothing unusual about plaintiff's 
manner until the tr•ain was 50 yards from him, ~and then 
the engineer did everything possi~ble to avoid the aooident. 
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Plaintiff, how·ever, argues that his demeanor made 
it apparent he vvould not get off the track (Brief, p. 9). 
He fails to 1nention the uncontradicted evidence produced 
hy his ovvn eye vvitness that when the unusual conduct 
occurred, the engineer n1ade an emergency application 
of brakes. He further argues that the eircumstances 
required responsive action when his own testimony 
establishes that responsive action \Vas taken immed'i,ately 
vYhen those circumstances appeared. The argument is 
palpably \veak and is crushed by the weight of plain-
tiff's o'vn evidence. 
Plaintiff becomes further entangled with principles 
when he. asserts that, because the accident could have 
been ~avoided by use of emergency brakes at 70 yar~ds, 
it was negligence for the engineer not to have ~applied 
emergency brakes a.t that distance. Plaintiff':s hindsight 
is remarkably clear. Equally clear is the proposition that 
negligence cannot be established .merely by showing 
that had the actor acted otherwise, no aecident would 
have occurred. Under plaintiff's theory, it would have 
been negligence to have started the train at all . See 
Eckenrode v. Penn. R. R. Co. (D.C.E.D. Penn., 1947), 71 
Fed. Supp. 764. 
Pl~aintiff cites numerous decisions Wlhich de~al gen-
erally V\rith the proble1n posed by this ea.se. All of these 
cases, hovvever, rest upon the fundan1ental rule that 
negligence depends upon foreseeability of injury. 
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Plaintiff has studiously avoided citations of Utah 
decisions analagous to the tl1e ease under consideration. 
One such case is .St.eggel v. S. L. ~ U. R .. Qo. (Ut!ah, 1917), 
50 Utah 139, 167 Pac. 237. In that case Steggel 'vas 
'valking· between the rails of defendant's track near 
American Fork, Utah, when. he was. stru'Ck ·by a tr·ain 
and kille·d. The track was unobstructed and ran in a 
straight line east and west. The train was running west 
from American .Fork at about 25 or 30 mph. The deceased 
appro.ache·d on the track from the west and \Vas observed. 
for a distance of about one-half mile until the accident. 
No attempt was made to check the spee~d of the train until 
it was too late to avoid stri.king the de'ceased. D·eceas·ed 
ha·d his hat pulled down to shade his eyes. The .day was 
bright .and the vie'Y unobstucted. Witnesses. for the 
plaintiff testified that they had assumed the _deceased 
would step off the track in time to avoid injury. Defend-
ant ·expected deeeased to step from the track momentarily 
as the train. was approaehing. This Court said: 
"To say that, under the circumstances and 
~conditions surrounding this· accident, as disclosed 
by the undisputed testim·ony, th~ defendant' was 
negligent, or, seeing the plaintiff's position and 
conduct while walking toward the approaching 
train, it recklessly or wantonly failed in its duty 
to the deceased, is to say that, in every case "\vhere 
a footman is seen approaching a moving train, it 
becomes the duty of the train crew ·Or operators 
in eharge to at once assume that no duty rests 
upon the footman to take any respon'Sihility on 
himself or to exercise any care or precaution for 
his own peTsonal safety and protection ; tha't the 
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operators of the train n1ust bring it to a stand-
still until the footn1an ·becomes mindful of the fact 
that he has placed himself in a dangerous position 
and concludes to step aside and ~permit the train 
to pass and subserve, in some measure, the con-
venience and safety of the public. Where, ·as here 
the undisputed facts are the deceased, being of 
mature age, sound of body and mind, without 
neeessity chooses to enter and 'va1k upon the 
defendant's track when the day was bright, the 
view unobstructed for more than a mile before 
him, and deliberately walks along th~ track in 
view of a rapidly approaching train which was, 
upon his entering the track, more than a mile away, 
by every reasonable hypothesis the defendant had 
the right to assume that he would see and hear, 
a;s it was his duty to see and hear, the approaching 
train, and that he would be timely in removing 
himself to a place of safety and avoid injury.'' 
(Page 240.) 
The true test in cases of this kind has been well 
pointed out by Utah decisions distinguishing hetwe·en the 
duty o-vved by railroad engineers to small children and 
the duty owed apparent adults. In Palmer v. Oregon 
Shortline R. R. Co., 34 Utah 466, 98 P. 689 (1908), the 
Court said: 
"In case of an adult or one of age having 
judgn1ent and discretion, who is a trespasser and 
is seen standing or walking on the track, the train 
operator in the first instance would have to do no 
more than give such a trespa'sser a warnjng. 
When this has been done the operator Tnay .assume 
that the trespasser will leave the track. Not so 
with a child of tender years.'' 
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. In J~rnalley v. 1-lio Grande Western R. R. Co., 34 Ut·ah 
423, 98 .Pac .. 311 (1908), a ease involving a child of five 
years of age, the Court .sai:d that ·an adult trespasser may 
be· expected t~ take care of himself and keep out of 
danger and the en1ployees about· the premises may reg-
ulate their conduct upon the presumption that he would 
·do so, until a situation is disclosed making ··it apparent 
that ·he is not a\\·are of the danger or peril threatening 
him. (Emp'hasis ours). 
In this case, plaintiff's own evidence shows that 
plaintiff w·as ap·parently a'vare of the ·danger at all times 
and was, to all,ap·pearances, able to take care of himself 
until the train was 50 yards from the point of impact and 
that at that instant full emergency procedures were taken 
to ~avoid the accident. The duty which plaintiff urges 
should he imposed upon the operators of railroads is 
the du~y to diagnose, ·from an engine cab at a distance 
of 100 yards, a condition of schizophrenia, catatonic 
type, and progressive muscular dystrophy and to be able 
. to determine and understand that a person who was 
ambulatory only seconds earlier, cannot now, because of 
such conditions, n1ove hack to the point of safety from 
'\\'"hich he had come. 
Plaintiff also urges th:at a city ordinance was violated 
in that the vvarning hell was not -s·ounded 440 yards bef.ore 
the crossing. This argument appears in this case for the 
first ti!ue in plaintiff's brief (Page 6). No such conten-
tion wa~ n1ade at the pretrials, as plaintiff must surely 
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have understood that the purpose of such an ordinance 
is to codify the rule that an eng~ineer has a duty to give 
notice of the approach of the train and that the require-
lnents are 1net when the train is at all times plainly visible, 
is actually observed, and its approach known. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL SINCE PLAIN-
TIFF'S EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
THAT· PLAINTIFF'S CONDUCT WAS THE PROXIMATE 
CAUSE OF HIS INJURIES. 
The sole proximate cause of plwintiff's injuries was 
plaintiff's eonduct in placing himself upon the tracks in 
front of the approaching train. This conduct was the 
efficient producing cause. The failure of the engineer to 
stop the tr~ain \vas at most, under the cireumstances 
disclosed by this record, a condition permitting plain-
tiff's own ·conduct to produce his injury. 
In J(ent et al v. Ogden L. ~I. Ry. Co., 50 Utah 328, 
167 P. 666 (1917) Mary Kent was struck ~and killed by 
a train \vhile \vaiting near the tracks at ~a crossing. The 
witnesses testified that Mary Kent crossed the tracks 
in front of the train; that she was standing ne,ar the end 
of the railroad tie when hit by the train. In reversing 
judgment for the plaintiff the ·court said: 
''If the deceased had stood upon the track 
under the circumstances here di~selosed until she 
was struck, no one could, in reason, contend that 
the position which she carelessly assumed was 
not the proxirnate cause of her injury. If tha~t be 
so, how can it reasonably be contended that the 
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position which she carelessly assumed, so near 
the track as to he in the path of the passing cars, 
likewise was not the cause of her injury~ Where 
one voluntarily assumes a position on or so near 
a r·ailway track that ·a train of cars in passing on 
the track must necessarily strike him, can reason-
able min1ds differ as to whether his act in so 
placing himself ~as the proximate cause of injury 
in ease the cars strike him~. We think not. What 
is: there to differ about~ It is physically impos-
sible for one to e'Scap·e injury ·if he· remains on 
or so near a railway traek as to he in the path 
of a ~passing train of cars. Even children are 
aware of the danger under those eircumstances. 
This cas.e is not distinguishable from the case of 
Steggel v. S. L. & Ut,ah R. Co., 50 Utah 139, 167 
P. 237." 
The p·roximate cause· of an injury is the primary 
moving cause without" which it would not have :been 
inflicted, but which, in the natural and ·probable sequence 
of events, and without the intervention of any new or 
independent eause, produoes the injury. Cox v. Thomp-
son (Utah, 1953) 254 P. (2~d) 1047. 
The o1nission vvhich plaintiff eompl~ains of in this 
case is the f~ailure of the engineer to place the b:vakes in 
em·ergency position 70 yards or n1ore north of the point 
of impact. Even if ,,~e assume for the S'ake. of argument 
that the engineer had such a duty, what would be the 
natural and probable result of this omission 1 In th.e 
natural and probable sequen·ce of events the plaintiff 
would certainly have retnoved hilnself to a place of saf·ety 
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on either side of the track. The primary 1noving cause 
of plaintiff's injuries was plaintiff's pla·cing himself 
in front of the train and remaining there in front of 
the oncO'rning train. The natur~al and probable conse-
quence of this conduct 'vould, of course, be personal 
injury to himself. It must surely, therefore, follow that 
the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury was plaintiff's 
own conduct. Without such conduct the injury would 
not have been inflicted. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED 
DEFENDANT'S MOTI,ON FO:R DISMISSAL SINCE PLAIN-
TIFF'S EVIDENCE E S T A B L I SHE D CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
\V ere it not for the contention made by the plaintiff 
that he was suffering from schizophrenia at the time of 
the accident there could be no doubt of his contri:but·ory 
negligence. See Compton, et al v. Ogden Union Ry. ~-­
Depot Co. (Utah, 1951) 235 P. (2d) 515. The question 
therefore is whether or not the evidence shows plaintiff 
to have been suffering, at the time of the accident, fr:om 
a mental illness of such a nature that he could not be 
guilty of contributory negligence in conducting himself 
in a manner which, f.or any person without such mental 
condition, 'vould ·bar recovery upon the ground of con-
tributory negligence. 
As a general rule if a person is able to appreciate 
danger he m:ay he t,JUilty of contributory negligence. It 
is ·only when a person by reason of n1ental incapacity 
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is ~vholly unable to apprehend apparent danger an·d to 
avoid exposure to it that he cannot be guilty of contribu-
tory negligenee. See 65 C.J.S. 782 (Negligence·, Section 
141). 
In Knox v. Snow, et al., (Utah, 1951) 229 P. (2d) 874, 
the court said : 
'' ... When the ·defen'Se of con tributary negli-
gence is urged as a groun·d for a _non-suit, it must 
appear that reasonable men, acting as triers of 
fact, would find, without any reasonable prob-
ability of differing in their views, either that the 
plaintiff knew and appreciated the danger or 
that ordinarily prudent men under the same 
circumstances would readily acquire such knowl-
edge and appreciation. As it generally is ex-
pressed a plaintiff will not be held to have been 
guilty of contributory negligence if it appears that 
he had no knowledge or means of knowledge 
of the danger, and conversely, he will be deemed 
to have been guilty if it is shown that he knew 
or reasonably should have known of the peril 
and might have avoided it by the exercise of 
ordinary eare ... " (Page 876.) 
The record ]n this case shows without conflict that 
th·e plaintiff ap,preciated that there was danger in the 
si tu.a tion ( R. 29). Plain tiff kne"r he -w~as facing ·a danger 
wh·en he \Vent on the track (R. 33:.34). 
Since the evidence conclusively shows that the plain-
tiff was aware of the danger inherent in the situation and 
that he had the 1ne•ans of rernoving hims-elf from the 
track, reasonrable 1nen cannot differ in concluding that 
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plaintiff V{as guilty of ne·gligence ·contri~buting to his own 
injury. This conclusion cannot be aff·ected in any way by 
the rnedical evidence since the sum 'and subst~ance of 
that evidence is to the effect only that based upon inter-
views n1any rnonths later, it was concluded that, at the 
time of this accident, plain tiff '"as S'chizophrenic to a 
degree ·w-hich is uncertra,in and unknown. 
Plaintiff's evidence sho\ved that plaintiff went upon 
the defendant's track and remained in front of the on-
coming train, in a position of danger to himself, to "test 
his faith" (R~ 43). Under such a st~ate of facts it appears 
clear that the plaintiff must he held to have assumed 
the risk of any danger he might then encounter. As was 
indicated by Chief Justice Wolfe in hi~s concurring 
opinion in the ·case of ~Clay v. Dunford, et al (Utah, 1952) 
239 P. (2d) 1075, if it be shown thrat there is ra clear 
risk and knowledge and appreciation of the ·danger, the 
ele~ction to take the chance may be classified as 'assump-
tion of risk although it might also constitute coD'tribu-
tory negligence. 
The evidence here shows (1) a palpably dangerous 
condition, namely the approach ~f a locomotive ; ( 2) 
knowledge and appreciation of the dange-r as shown 
by the statement of the plaintiff that this was a test 
of his faith; and (3) a voluntary act by pl,aintiff showing 
that he was willing to take the chance as indicated by 
his placing himself upon the track as t'he train 
approached. 
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It -would be a harsh lu\v vvhich would per1nit a person 
to throw hintself in the path of an :ap.proachin·g train to 
test his courage and to then bring an action against 
the railroad for causing~ the injury. It would be equally 
as logical to perrnit a person injured while p;articipating 
in a game of ''Russian Roulette'' to recover against the 
manufacturer of the revolver, or to permit a person 
injure·d while atte:rnpting to take his life hy carbon 
1nonoxide poisoning to maintain an action against the 
supplier of the gasoline or automobile used ~as. his instru-
ment. 
In this case the train '\Vas n1erely an instrument being 
u·seod by plaintiff to test his f.~ith. in God. Under such 
circumstances we earnestly submit the law should not, 
and ·does not, hold the owner of. the instrument respon-
sible for the conduct of the person who so uses that 
instrument. 
That plaintiff well understood the ·danger inherent 
in tl1e situation is established by the evidence indicating 
his conduet to be a test of faith. Without danger, th·ere 
could he no test. 
That plaintiff had the means of ~avoiding the injury 
is sho,vn by the fact that he crossed the tracks and there 
pl~aced himself bet'\veen the tracks. 
Since plaintiff knew of the danger and -could have 
avoided it, he is guilty of contri,butory negligence as a 
matt,er of law. 
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT RE-
VERSIBLE ERROR IN EXCLUDING THE TESTIMONY OF 
THE WITNESS SKEEN RELATIVE TO OVERLOADING OF 
THE TRAIN. 
During the course of the trial the plaintiff sought to 
introduce so1ne evidence by witness Skeen as to whether 
or not the train "\\7as overloaded (R. 68). The trial court 
pointed out to counsel for plaintiff that there was no 
contention in the pretrial order that the defendant was 
negligent in operating an overloaded tr~ain, nor was 'aD 
issue of fact framed to permit introduction of that evi-
dence. (R. 13, 14). The ·court further p·ointed out that 
if the evidence was ofrered for the purpose of showing 
that the en~ineer \vas negligent in the operation of a 
train as it was then constituted he would let the evidence 
in, but if the evidence was offered to elicit a new form 
of negligence by 'vay of driving an overloaded train, the 
objection would be sustained (R. 70). 
CounS'el for plaintiff immediately abandoned this 
line of questioning without an offer of p1roof that the 
train did or did not react as if it were overloaded. There 
is accordingly no error in the judge's ruling which is 
reviewable by this Court. See Newton v. Los Angeles 
Transit Lines (District Court of Appeal of Calif., 1951), 
237 P. (2d) 682. 
Even if the court's ruling were properly before this 
Court, there was no error in the ruling. In the pretrial 
order the issue \Vas \VhetJher the defendant was negligent 
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in driving the tra1n. The contention 1nade by plaintiff 
was that the engineer negligently f.ailed to bring the 
train to a stop. Plaintiff at no time conten·ded the train 
was ·overloaded and that defendant 'vas negligent in 
operating an overloaded train. Further, there was no 
evidence or offer of evidence to sho\v that the stopping 
·distance would have been appreciably less had the load 
been less. 
There 1s an additional reason why the· trial court 
did not comn1i t reversible error in excluding tlhe testi-
mony. sought to be elicited from Skeen. Duri~g the 
course of the questions being a~ked of Skeen eoncerning 
his experience, it was establish·ed that he_had not operated 
a locomotive of the kind in question. His only experience 
had been, in geiieral, ·experience on another railroad, 
"There he '\Vas operating a different kind of locomotive 
(R. 59, 60). Wh-en the court atte-mpted to question him 
to detern1ine whether or not he could h'ave an opinion 
coneerning overloading of the train ·by reason of being 
a p·assenger in the cab, he was never able to give the 
court sufficient facts to determin-e the answer to that 
question. (R. 64) 
Thus, it is apparent that even if he had been ~allowed 
to testify, his · opinion would have had so little weight 
as to have been n1eaningless and the evidence could not 
have a~fected th·e ruling of the trial court. 
In su1nmary, therefore, on this phase of the case, it 
1s clear that the trial court ruled correctly since the 
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theory on which plaintiff 'vas attempting to proceed 
had never been presented in piaintiff 's complaint, in his 
amended complaint, or in either of the pretrial hearings 
on this case. Furth-er, plaintiff Inade no offer of proof 
to enable the court to detern1ine whether the alleged 
overloading of the train could have had a causal connec-
tion with the accident, and it does not appear that 
plaintiff had available any facts -to support suc:h an 
offer of proof even if one had been made. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts in this case do not appear to he in conflict 
on any n1a terial matter. They rev·eal conclusively that 
this accident occured when plaintiff, who was apparently 
normal and not unusual in appearance, stepped from a 
place of safety into the middle of the train track in front 
of an oncoming train 'and, despite every warning that 
. could be given, remained there to be struck ~by the loco-
motive. Until the train was 50 yards away, the train crew, 
under any standard of care known to the law, had the 
right to presume pl'aintiff would remove himself to a 
place of s:afety. When he did not, the crew aeted instantly 
to stop the train, but it was too late. 
Under such circumstances, it would be a judicial 
travesty to dete-rmine that the train operator was negli-
gent. Such 'a holding would place upon the railroads 
the intolerable burden of stopping a train whenever 
any p~rson entered upon the tracks, since the operator 
could never assume, as operators have rightfully assumed 
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for generations, that the person on the tra-cks would 
yield the right of way to the train, so that the train 
couid, jn sorne measure, subserve the convenience and 
safety of the public. 
The J udg1nent of the DiS'trict Court was correct, 
and it shoul'd be affirme·d. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN H. SNOW and 
H. G. CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant and · 
Respondent. 
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